Mohammed S. Dajani Daoudi
Introduction
Rabbi went faithfully, every day for twenty years, to the Wailing Wall (Kotel) to pray for peace between the Jews and the Arabs. One day, a reporter who learned of his dedicated mission thought it mightmake a good story. So he decided to interview him. He began his interview by asking him: ‘‘How does it feel to go every day for twenty years to the Wailing Wall to pray for peace?’’ The Rabbi responded: ‘‘It feels like talking to a wall!’’
Why is it that peace seems so elusive? Why is it that we feel like talk- ing to a wall when it comes to the important matter of peace?1 One reason is because we always evaluate an issue in a certain context—‘‘a set of condi- tions that place the issue or problem in a particular light that suggests how the issue should be dealt with or how the problem should be resolved; as one scholar once remarked, ‘‘If all you have is a hammer, then all the problems look like a nail!’’
In his classic work, Stable Peace, Kenneth Boulding defines the con- cept of peace as follows: ‘‘The concept of peace has both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side, peace signifies a condition of good management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness, and love. On the negative side, it is conceived as the absence of something—the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict, and war.’’2
Palestinians and Israelis disagree over the peace issue because they
view it in two diametrically opposed contexts—that is, with different
beliefs, interests and values in mind. When competing actors—that is, Palestinians and Israelis—place the peace issue in their own conflicting contexts, decisions by policy makers to give more weight to one context than another typically determine the outcome of the dispute, pushing it more in the direction of war and conflict rather than in the direction of peace and conciliation. Putting Israeli security needs above Palestinian national needs resulted in making peace illusive since one party viewed its own values and needs above those of the other. One-sided total security in the long run is a theoretical and practical impossibility, unless the opponent is wholly annihilated.
This study is divided into three parts. The first part looks at where are we today, that is, living the Big Dream—conflict. The second part looks at where we ought to be, that is, living the Small Hope—concili- ation. The third part deals with the question of how to get there— peace.
Historical background
Palestine was under Ottoman occupation from 1516 till 1918. In 1922, the British Mandate was put in effect. It lasted until May 15, 1948, when the State of Israel was declared. At the time, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip3 were left without any strong centralized Palestinian authority. Eventually, the Gaza Strip was placed under Egyptian administration, while the West Bank opted in 1950 for unity with Jordan. In June 1967, the West Bank and Gaza Strip came under Israeli Occupation. Jordan kept its constitutional ties with the West Bank until July 31, 1988, when King Hussein severed administrative and legal ties in order to reaffirm the Palestinian entity.
Following lengthy secret talks beginning in April 1992 and masterminded by Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgan Holst, the Oslo Accord between the PLO and Israel was secretly hammered out in Oslo, Norway on August 13, 1993.4 It called for an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho, which would then fall under the civilian control of a Palestinian autonomous author- ity. This historic step was followed by the Declaration of Principles (DoP) signed by Israel and the PLO in Washington at the White House on September 13, 1993. It stipulated mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO and a commitment by the Palestinian side to end terrorism and
eliminate calls for the destruction of the State of Israel from the Palestin- ian Charter. The DoP called for a transitional period of no more than five years, during which final status arrangements for a lasting and comprehensive peace settlement will be negotiated. Article I of the DoP stipulated the establishment of a ‘‘Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority’’ for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, ‘‘for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and
338.’’ Major issues, such as Jerusalem refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders and foreign relations and cooperation with other neighbors, were deferred to ‘‘final status’’ negotiations to begin two years later. The DoP was ambiguous on other issues such as:
1. Definition of the territory of the Jericho autonomous zone.
2. Release of the Palestinian political prisoners.
3. The nature of Israeli military withdrawals or redeployments.
4. Acts of violence by extremists on both sides.
The Declaration of Principles had a fundamental feature that had an impact on the Palestinian public administration system: its declared aims at establishing interim arrangements that would lead to ‘‘a Perma- nent Settlement.’’
On February 4, 1994, the Gaza-Jericho Autonomy Agreement,5 a three-page document on principles of self-rule outlining the first stage of Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and Jericho, was initialed in Cairo by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Added to it was an eight-page document that included details and maps of the control of border crossings and security arrangements for Jewish settlers in Gaza. The accord called for shared responsibility at border crossings but gave Israel the ultimate right of decision. Israel remained in control of the settlements, military locations, and security matters. Joint Israeli- Palestinian forces led by Israel would patrol Gaza roads leading from Jewish settlements to Israel. The boundaries were not covered in this Agreement.
The Gaza-Jericho Autonomy Agreement signed in Cairo on May 4, 1994, stipulated that the Palestinian Authority shall establish ‘‘a strong police force—the Palestinian Police.’’
The Palestinian Authority Political Program (PAPP) declared on May 28, 1994, the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) ‘‘as an extenuation of the PLO.’’ The PAPP maintained that the PA was ‘‘a temporary interim authority implementing its tasks until general democratic elections in the Palestinian land takes place.’’ The PA was authorized to execute the interim programs during the interim phase in order to achieve a program for connecting the interim period to the final solu- tion. The PA was authorized to ‘‘temporarily exercise its executive and legislative mandate until the general elections.’’ Among the main tasks designated to the PA were:
1. Preparing for legislative and municipal elections and ensuring their free nature and legitimacy.
2. Planning and formulating an active local governmental structure, which included a new framework for local, municipal, and village councils.
3. Drafting laws and decrees especially for the Palestinian Authority’s institutions.
4. Coordinating with international institutions and donors in develop- ment programs.
5. Reconstruction of the judiciary system.
6. Preparation of modern, efficient monetary system.
7. Complementing and structuring primary institutions such as a trea- sury, development bank, employee bureau, accounting bureau, administrative monitor, economic council, and statistic bureau.
8. Reorganization of the public service sectors.
The Early Empowerment Accord (EEA) initialed in Cairo on August 24, 1994 by Palestinian minister Dr. Nabil Sha’ath and Israeli negotia- tor Danny Rothschild expanded the PA’s authority in five key ‘‘spheres’’ to cover all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The five spheres of ‘‘early empowerment,’’ for which PA authority extended beyond the autonomous areas of Jericho and the Gaza Strip, included education, culture, health, social welfare, tourism, and direct taxation/ Value Added Tax (VAT). According to the EEA, Israel would continue to control the remaining civilian administrative functions until after the Palestinian elections. The Israeli Cabinet on August 28, 1994 approved the EEA, but stated that it was conditional on Palestinian efforts to halt violence and terrorism. Issues delayed until the permanent status negotiations included Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, and military locations.
The Early Empowerment Agreement signed in Gaza on August 29, 1994 by Israel and the PA, transferred to the PA from the Israeli Military Government and its Civil Administration in the West Bank the powers and responsibilities in the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, tourism, direct taxation and VAT. According to this agreement, Israel was to provide the PA to enable free access to all information that is necessary for an effective and smooth transfer. The PA became fully responsible for the proper func- tioning of the offices included in the spheres and for the management of their personnel in all aspects, including employment and placement of employment, payment of their salaries and pensions, and ensuring other employee rights. The PA continued employing Palestinian employees of the Civil Administration who were employed in the offices included in each sphere and maintained their rights. Article VII of the Agreement transferred legislative powers also to the PA. It authorized the PA to promulgate secondary legislation regarding the powers and responsibilities transferred to it. Such legislation included amendments and changes to the existing laws, regulations and mili- tary orders. However, Israel would have no reservations concerning any proposed legislation for such legislation to enter into force. Article XI of the Agreement stipulated that the PA will do its utmost to estab- lish its revenue collection system immediately with the intent of col- lecting direct taxes and VAT.
On September 28, 1995, Israel and the PLO signed the landmark 400- pages Interim Autonomy Agreement (IAA),6 at the White House in Washington, paving the way for an Israeli withdrawal from all Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The IAA provided for two elec- tions: one for the head of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in January 1996; and another to elect an 82-member self-governing authority—the Palestinian Council—which would have legislative and executive powers to be held in April 1996. It also provided that legislative power would be exercised by the Palestinian Legislative Council as a whole, while its executive power would be exercised by a committee of the Council called the Executive Authority. This committee consisted of Council members together with appointed officials. The powers of the Coun- cil would extend to all matters within its jurisdiction. However, it did not have powers in the sphere of foreign relations. The IAA did,however, provide for a number of areas in which the PLO might, on behalf of the Council, conduct negotiations and sign agreements.
The IAA divided the West Bank into three areas:
1. Area A with full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and internal security.
2. Area B with full Palestinian civil jurisdiction and joint Israeli-Pales- tinian internal security.
3. Area C with Israeli civil and overall security control.
Although Israel continued to control some 70 percent of the land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the IAA allowed the Palestinians to conduct their own internal affairs, to reduce points of friction between Israelis and Palestinians, and to open a new era of coopera- tion and coexistence based on common interest, dignity, a mutual respect. At the same time, it protected Israelis’ vital interests, and in particular its security interests, both with regard to external security and the personal security of its citizens in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Negotiations on the final disposition of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were due to begin no later than May 1996. During the first stage of the Accord, it was agreed that Palestinians would gain full control of the municipal areas and would have administrative control over an esti- mated 460 villages.
The IAA contained three undertakings from the PLO to Israel:
1. A commitment to annul the Palestinian Covenant clauses calling for the destruction of Israel.
2. A commitment to put a stop to hostile propaganda.
3. A commitment to wage war against terrorism.
To the main body of the Agreement were appended six annexes deal- ing with security arrangements, elections, civil affairs (transfer of pow- ers), legal matters, economic relations, and Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. The permanent status negotiations were to deal with the remaining issues, including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations, cooperation with neighboring coun- tries, and so forth.
The Wye River Memorandum (WRM), signed on October 23, 1998, called for the implementation of the IAA and the resumption of the final status talks. It included modifying the PLO Charter, opening Gaza Airport and the Safe Passage connecting Gaza with the West Bank, reduction in the number of Palestinian police, and release of Palestinian political prisoners.
The Sharm Esh-Sheikh Agreement (SSA), signed by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PA President Yasser Arafat in Sharm Esh-Sheikh on September 4, 1999, stipulated that Israel would withdraw in three stages from 11 percent of the West Bank, release 350 political prisoners, open the safe passage, and begin permanent status talks on September 13, 1999, to reach a framework for a settlement by February 2000 and a final peace agreement by September 2000.
The Al-Aqsa Intifada that began on September 28, 2000, and the Israeli Revolving Door Policy of incursions into the West Bank that came as a reaction to it, sealed the fate of the Oslo Peace Process, bringing it to a sudden abrupt halt and causing unprecedented human losses on both sides, heavy destruction of Palestinian infrastructure and economy, as well as vast demolition of main PA institutions.
The peace process
The political and economic environment in the late 1980s and early 1990s was charged with anger, hopelessness, tension and anxiety, resulting in a wave of extremism and growing tendencies for radicalism and thus precipitating an unpredicted dangerous situation in the region. For this reason, there was an urgent need to search for new options to defuse the crisis. Since the road of confrontation and violence failed to produce any tangible results for both conflicting parties, there was no other alternative but to search for new avenues and fresh approaches to meet the new challenges.
In 1991, the Madrid Peace Conference brought a glimmer of hope.7 It
was followed two years later by the Washington Declaration signed and sealed by the two antagonists and witnessed by a superpower.8 This historic event inspired people to hope: ‘‘Finally peace is attainable,’’ they calmed their fears. However, since its early days in late 1993, the Oslo Peace Process lurched from one crisis to another with no light at the end of the tunnel.9 Thus, our life in the last decade had been a combination of despair and hope. When the waves of terrorism ebbs, we are distraught with despair; when waves of terrorism subside, we are full of hope. But hope for what?
Big Dream/Small Hope framework
In her book, The Vocabulary of Peace, Shulamith Harevern maintains that the Oslo Accords brought an essential change: ‘‘From now on, it is not automati- cally Jew against Arab and Arab against Jew; it is the Jews and Arabs who support peace, and those, Jews and Arabs both, who oppose it…’’10 Thus, one main fruit of the Oslo Peace Process is the radical change in the identity of the protagonists. The identity of the two conflicting parties to the Middle East conflict has been transformed from national in character (Arab-Israeli) to more sociopolitical in character (Pro-Peace/Anti-Peace).
The well-known Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish once wondered:
‘‘What is more important—a small hope or a big dream?’’ In my view, the Oslo Accords brought two other radical changes. The first was the Israeli recognition of ‘‘the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people,’’ the first genuine recognition in the history of Zionism that the Palestin- ians are ‘‘a people,’’11… shaking the basic foundations of the Zionist denial of the very existence of a Palestinian people as exemplified by Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir famous statement: ‘‘It was not as though there was a Palestinian people and in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist.’’12
Another essential change was: ‘‘From now on it is not Palestinians against Israelis and Israelis against Palestinians; but it is Palestinians and Israelis, who believe in the big dream, and those Israelis and Palestinians who believe in the small hope…’’ Thus, as the peace process progressed, this identification has crystallized more into cultural/psychological character which assem- bled in one camp those Palestinians and Israelis who are for the Big Dream in mortal combat with those in the other camp of the Small Hope. But what is the Big Dream? What is the Small Hope? What is the Big Dream for Israelis? What is the Big Dream for the Palestinians?
The Big Dream
For the Israelis, the Big Dream is to wake up one morning and find that Palestinians have disappeared in the desert and that only Jews live in the promised land of Eretz Israel in a purely Jewish state with the two rivers as its borders and unified Jerusalem as its capital. Among the early Jews who believed in this dream was Zeev Jabotinsky who advocated force to contain the Arabs of Palestine behind an ‘‘Iron Wall’’ of Zionist resolve which they will be powerless to break down. He considered a ‘‘voluntary agreement’’ between the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine as ‘‘inconceivable now or in the foreseeable future.’’13
For the Palestinians, the Big Dream is to wake up one morning and find that all Israelis have departed and only Palestinians live in the Holy Land in an independent Arab state from river to sea as its borders and al-Quds al-Sherif as its capital.
Advocates of the Big Dream are those, at present in the majority, who struggle for the eventual triumph of their perception of good over evil as resembled by the other, and as a result seek to establish their state exclu- sively on the historic land of Palestine/Israel. In their effort to achieve their goal, the Big Dream camp exercises strong opposition to the Oslo Accord and all subsequent agreements such as Hamas14 within the Palestinian community and the Likud Party within the Israeli community. In his book Sharing the Promised Land: A Tale of Israelis and Palestinians, Dilip Hiro accuses Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of ‘‘doing his utmost to wreck the peace process.’’15 It demonizes the other and implements a highly nationalistic curriculum in its educational system that deligitimizes and demonizes the other. It promotes conflict education that teaches the new generation the war philosophy of the old generation. It appeals to the emo- tional bondage of the people to the land and focuses on historical ties of the past. It denies the narrative of the other and ignores their history, cul- ture literature, and traditions.
In the Big Dream scenario, Israeli morbid fantasy is expressed in the saying: ‘‘The only good Palestinian is a dead Palestinian!’’ On the other hand, Palestinian morbid fantasy: ‘‘The only good Israeli is a dead Israeli!’’
The Big Dream vision is reflected in different aspects in both societies in conflict.16 In the daily life, the Big Dream is reflected in denying the other, building negative mirror image of the other, divisiveness, demon- ization of the other, mistrust of the other, blaming the other, insecurity, broken hearts, shattered families, and vanished dreams.
In both countries, the Big Dream advocates teach historical Palestine/ Israel with all its total geography with maps including pre-1948 Palestine as the envisioned state of Palestine/Israel. In Palestine, Israel is viewed as a usurper state founded on the destruction of historical Palestine and the misery of its people.
1948 Arab-Jewish war is remembered by Israelis as ‘‘the War of Indepen- dence/Liberation’’; in contrast, the same event is remembered by the Pal- estinians as the ‘‘Catastrophe/Disaster/Nakba.’’ Rouhana and Bar Tal describe how each narrative negates the other:
According to the Palestinian narrative, the Jewish settlers occupied the land, and Palestinians were dispossessed and displaced. The Palestinian narrative views this influx an invasion of foreigners who took over the country from Palestinians and in the process pushed out Palestinians, making them refugees in the neighboring countries. According to the Zionist narrative, the land was liber- ated and redeemed in a process of national revival. The Jews gath- ered their exiles in the land of their forefathers to establish their state, which was attacked by hostile, non-accepting Arabs at its birth. As an outcome of Arab aggression and defeat, the Palestinians became refugees.17
In the Big Dream Palestinian refugees aspire to exercise their right of return to the places of origin in the State of Israel.18 Politics and religion shape the character and tone of all other subjects such as civic education, language, history, literature, and geography. Jerusa- lem is proclaimed as the capital of one nation at the expense of the other.
The media in both Israeli and Palestinian communities advance the Big Dream theme.19 Each echoes the popular messages: ‘‘We are victims; they are aggressors’’; ‘‘Our victims are a terrible tragedy; their victims are statistics’’; ‘‘Our actions are legitimate; their actions violate interna- tional law’’; ‘‘Our aspirations are noble; their aspirations are despicable’’; ‘‘Our cause is just; their cause is evil’’; ‘‘We are peace lovers; they are war mongers’’; ‘‘Our hands are clean; their hands are stained.’’20 Press coverage of the other ‘‘other’’ is: biased, emotional, exaggerated, myopic, and nationalistic.
In evaluating Israeli and Palestinian education, one finds that the knowledge imparted through both Israeli and Palestinian textbooks reflect the Big Dream theme.21 They are hardly objective, truthful, or fac- tual. Both Palestinian and Israeli textbooks instill enmity and hatred. They are biased, and include visual and verbal incitements, as well as negative stereotype images of the other. Both curriculums delegitimize and demonize the other, and fail to embody the principles of coexis- tence, peace, tolerance, multiculturalism and diversity. Classes in Israeli and Palestinian schools and programs at universities do not include peace education courses.
The Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace claims: ‘‘Palestinian textbooks instill hatred of Israel and Jews …. The PA has ‘‘rejected inter- national calls’’ to modify the Palestinian textbooks.’’22 Similar views are echoed in the Israeli press: ‘‘The incitement to hatred of Jews and the destruction of Israel, which has always been part of the Palestinian school curriculum, was intensified.’’23 Hillary Clinton claims: ‘‘A book that is required reading for Palestinian six graders actually starts off stat- ing, ‘There is no alternative to destroying Israel.’’’24 The spokesman for Israeli settlers proclaimed: ‘‘We teach our children to respect life, while they teach that if you die with Jewish blood on your hands you go to heaven and are fed with grapes by 15 virgins.’’25 Charles Krauthammer claims that since the signing of the Oslo Accords, the Palestinians had ‘‘intensified the propaganda, the anti-semitism, in their pedagogy and in their media’’ and that while Israel had ‘‘assiduously’’ changed its text- books to prepare for peace, ‘‘on the Palestinian side, the opposite was happening.’’26 However, George Washington Professor Nathan Brown finds such charges ‘‘inaccurate.’’ He concludes: ‘‘While highly nationalis- tic, the Palestinian curriculum does not incite hatred, violence, and anti-Semitism.’’27 Similar views are stated in the Study on the New Pales- tinian Curriculum prepared by Israel Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), which concludes: ‘‘The overall orientation of the Palestinian curriculum is peaceful…. It does not openly incite against Israel and the Jews. It does not openly incite hatred and violence.’’28
Despite drafting a new curriculum, Palestinian education remains a source of conflict since it includes such words as ‘‘Palestine’’ and ‘‘Jerusalem’’ used in the new Palestinian textbooks but without definition is interpreted by the other as a denial of the two-state solution. For instance, on one cover of a textbook on national education (grade 2, 2001) is a British Man- date stamp that originally had Palestine written on it in English, Arabic and Hebrew and that now has the Hebrew erased from it. Cities located in the State of Israel, such as Akka, Haifa, Nazareth and Jaffa, are referred to in Palestinian textbooks as part of Palestine, which is interpreted as a denial of the existence of the State of Israel. Textbooks teaching the Arabic language in grade 6 include titles such as ‘‘Our Homeland Palestine’’ that shows a picture of the city of Akka, which the Oslo Agreement designates within proper Israel. Also, while Moslem and Christian religion, culture and heritage is taught to students, Jewish religion is ignored and thus cre- ating a rift with the other. Students are taught that ‘‘the [refugee] camp is not to be considered an original homeland for the Palestinian refugee, it is but a temporary place in which he was forced to live, and all Palestinians are waiting for the return of each Palestinian refugee to his city or village from which he was forced to leave.’’ This position contradicts the spirit of the Oslo Accords. In an announcement addressed ‘‘To the Palestinian Lead- ership,’’ in January 2001, over thirty Israeli peace activists, intellectuals and politicians announced publicly that ‘‘we shall never be able to agree to the return of the refugees to within the borders of Israel, for the meaning of such a return would be the elimination of the State of Israel.’’29 The leading figure in the Israeli peace movement, author Amos Oz, views the right of return to Israel of Palestinian refugees as a Palestinian demand to have ‘‘two states, both of them for Palestinian refugees.’’30 Robert Mallay and Hussein Agha, whose article on Camp David Summit shed much light on the secret negotiations, wrote: ‘‘The Palestinians, while maintaining the right of the refugees to return to the homes which they had lost in 1948, were ready to link the implementation of the resolution to a mecha- nism which would provide substitutes for the refugees and would restrict the number of refugees who would return to Israel itself.’’31
In teaching Islamic education in grade 6, the focus is on ‘‘jihad rheto- ric’’ and the lesson is that ‘‘the Moslem loves his country and defends it to stir national feelings to regain the homeland.’’ Pupils are taught that it is their religious duty to be part of the struggle against occupation; however, this lesson is not balanced with any religious lessons on peace. Its nostal- gic teaching of a vanished past has an anachronistic quality about the Big Dream textbooks. For example, a second grade text reads: ‘‘a family takes a trip to Jaffa, smelling lemons and oranges along the way.’’ This of course is the Jaffa of the past; current drivers along the way entering the city are more likely to smell the polluted air rather than oranges. This teaches Palestinians to yearn for a world in the past that does not exist anymore. Such education enforces fantasies of the Big Dream.32
On the other side, Maureen Meehan finds Israeli education needing much reform. She writes that ‘‘Israeli textbooks and children’s literature promote racism and hatred toward Palestinians and Arabs.’’ She asserts that ‘‘Israeli school textbooks as well as children’s storybooks, according to recent academic studies and surveys, portray Palestinians and Arabs as ‘murderers,’ ‘rioters,’ ‘suspicious,’ and generally backward and unpro- ductive. Direct delegitimization and negative stereotyping of Palestinians and Arabs are the rule rather than the exception in Israeli schoolbooks.’’ Professor Daniel Bar-Tal of Tel Aviv University studied 124 elementary, middle, and high school textbooks on grammar and Hebrew literature, history, geography and citizenship. Bar-Tal concluded that Israeli text- books present the view that Jews are involved in a justified, even humanitarian, war against an Arab enemy that refuses to accept and acknowledge the existence and rights of Jews in Israel.33
In the Big Dream, Israelis maintain that hiding behind walls would provide them with the national security they seek.34 However, the histor- ical experiences show the fallacy of this assumption. For instance, the Great Wall of China, built in 221 BC and stretching 4,100 km/2,550 mi across north China, failed to repel attacks from nomads to the north; the Constantinople Wall failed to protect the city and was eventually destroyed in the year 1453; the Maginot French defensive fortifications constructed 1929–31 to act as protection against German invasion failed to prevent the German attack of 1940; the Barlev defenses along the Suez Canal crumbled and thus could not protect the Israeli western front in 1973; more recently, the 96-mile, 11.8-foot-high Berlin Wall, built in 1961, could not prevent East Germans from fleeing to West Germany and was finally torn down in 1989.
The lessons drawn from history are that great walls provide a false feeling of security without providing much protection. They symbolize failure in diplomatic communications and are no substitute for political solutions. They also reflect a negative international image indicating lack of peace strategies. Thus while the Big Dream advocates call for building walls to separate them from the other, the Small Hope advocates call for building bridges of knowledge and understanding based on peace and justice.
The Small Hope
Advocates of the Small Hope are those, at present in the minority, who believe in the peaceful coexistence between the two peoples and call for the establishment of a two-state solution (State of Israel next to the State of Palestine created in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) living next to each other in harmony, peace and security, with Jerusalem as a shared capital for both.
Refugees would exercise their right of return to the State of Palestine or accept compensation.35 As the Palestinian professor of sociology Elia Zureik states, ‘‘By accepting the Madrid formula for the Middle East peace talks, which excludes the United Nations as the structure for resolving the Palestine refugee problem, the Palestinians have seriously weakened their demand for the implementation of the right of return.’’36 Although the Israeli-Palestinian DoP of 1993 is completely silent on the vital issue of the right of return, Edward Said in Peace and Its Discontents maintains that the Palestinian claim to the right of return was substantially weakened by the DoP.37 In contrast to the Big Dream, agreements in the Small Hope are holy and honored by both parties.
Politics and religion are discussed independently and separately and do not dominate the contents and nature of all other subjects.
The Small Hope advocates teach Israel/Palestine as two independent neighboring states with Palestine as West Bank and Gaza Strip while Israel’s boundaries would reflect the 1967 borders with minor modifica- tions; refugees would exercise their right of return to the state of Pales- tine in addition to being compensated; politics and religion are discussed independently and separately without dominating the contents and nature of all other subjects. In the Small Hope vision, religion becomes a source of peace inspiration.38
The Small Hope believers are devout disciples of the Book of Proverbs, the Hebrew Bible that instructs: ‘‘Peace will not rise by force, but only through understanding’’; the Christian Bible, which says: ‘‘Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God’’ (Matthew 3:16); as well as the Muslim Holy Quran, which states in Surah 47:35: ‘‘Call for peace. And if they lean to peace, then leaneth thou too to it, and trust in Allah; verily he is the all-hearing, all-knowing.’’ Rather than teaching controversies and differences in religion, peace advocates focus on commonalities such as The Golden Rule in Judaism: ‘‘What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbour. This is the whole Torah; all the rest is commentary’’ (Hillel, Talmud, Shabbat 3/9); in Christianity: ‘‘In everything, do to others as you would have them do to you; for this is the law and the prophets’’ (Matthew 7:12), in Islam:
‘‘Not one of you truly believes until you wish for others what you wish for yourself ’’ (The Prophet Mohammed, Hadith).
In the Small Hope, society shows tolerance. As Joshua Leibman states, ‘‘Tolerance is the positive and cordial effort to understand another’s beliefs, practices, and habits without necessarily sharing or accepting them.’’
The aim of the Small Hope is to build bridges for peace and justice with others, to help future generations make the right choice between war and peace, to make them realize that they do not have a monopoly over the truth, to give the ability to treat opinions and interests of the other with respect, to help solve problems through peace culture, to develop a sense of civic duty and personal responsibility for the fate of not just one’s own country, but for the other.39
In the world of the Small Hope, Jerusalem would become the inter- national City of Peace reflecting the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi- religious, and peaceful nature of the city.
In the educational system of the Small Hope, peace education is adopted by both Israeli and Palestinian ministries of education. Montes- sori teaching methodology would be adopted by private schools.40 As summarized by Bar-Tal, peace education aims at achieving the following: goals:
…to foster changes that will make the world a better, more humane place. The goal is to diminish, or even to eradicate a vari- ety of human ills ranging from injustice, inequality, prejudice, and intolerance to abuse of human rights, environmental destruction, violent conflict, war, and other evils in order to create a world of justice, equality, tolerance, human rights, environmental quality, peace and other positive features.41
According to I. Harris, the objectives of peace education in a situa- tion such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would be:
…to break down enemy images and break through a process of numbing and denial about atrocities committed in intractable con- flicts…promote compassion for the suffering of those in the other group, in the hopes of reducing ethnic and religious hatred, and bringing members of conflicting groups together in a diologic communication process that searches for common understandings. The key is to accept the other and respect the inherent humanity that resides in all humans.42
Textbooks would not include negative images and adjectives of other; negative stereotypes in describing the other; pejorative terminol- ogy. On the other hand, it would include narratives of the other; positive features and traits of the other; stories about friendship and cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians; and a human, multidimensional, indi- vidual approach. The Small Hope educational peace strategy aims at including the following elements:
1. Democracy: fostering independent and creative thinking.43
2. Peace-orientation: focusing on the acceptance of the other and embody- ing mutual respect for the other.
3. Non-authoritarianism: avoiding placing any stress on authority and making manifest that truth is not absolute.
4. Rationality: teaching students to think in a rational way avoiding emo- tional decision making.
5. Tolerance: teaching tolerance of the other.
6. Compassion: promoting compassion for the suffering of the other.
7. Cultural sensitivity: Being culturally sensitive; for instance, using the following definition quoted from the Encarta Online Encyclopedia to define Al-Intifada in the Palestinian context: ‘‘throwing off, as a dog throws off fleas.’’ Using this definition may offend the Palestinians who are being portrayed as a ‘‘dog’’ as well as the Israelis who are being portrayed as ‘‘fleas.’’
Generally, the aim of peace education focus on building bridges for peace and justice with the other. Its objectives focus on helping future generations make the right choice between war and peace, making each realize that they do not have a monopoly over the truth; giving each the ability to treat the other’s opinions and interests with respect; helping one solve his problems through peace instruments; developing a sense of civic duty and personal responsibility for the fate of not just one’s own country, but for the other.
Media coverage of other in the Small Dream reflects neutrality, accuracy, honesty, objectivity, humanity, broad-mindedness, as well as promoting peace and conciliation.
In the society of the Small Dream, there is no monopoly for one party over the truth, as reflected in this wise Jewish folktale:
Cohen and Levi both approached the rabbi in an attempt to resolve a festering dispute between them. After Cohen relates to the rabbi his side of the story, the rabbi pronounces to him: ‘‘You are right.’’ Following Levi’s statement of the facts as he sees them, the rabbi declares to him: ‘‘You are right.’’ Once the two have departed, the rabbi’s wife turns to the rabbi and asks: ‘‘But rabbi, how can they both be right?’’ To this question, the rabbi responds: ‘‘You are also right.’’
Conciliation and forgiveness
No doubt, there is an urgent need to invoke the spirit of reconciliation44 in order to reach a long, lasting peace.45 But many feel that reconciliation will be difficult to reach if both sides to the conflict are not prepared to acknowledge their responsibility and guilt.46 Palestinians tend to distrust the term ‘‘reconciliation’’ as they feel it doesn’t do justice to their pain and suffering. Hizkias Assefa argues that, ‘‘The central question in recon- ciliation is not whether justice is done, but rather how one goes about doing it in ways that can also promote future harmonious and positive relationships between parties that have to live with each other whether they like it or not.’’47 In The Palestinian Exodux-1948-88, the Palestinian Pro- fessor Rashid Khalidi raises the issues of responsibility and atonement in order to achieve reconciliation:
We need truth so that the harm done in 1948 can be acknowl- edged by all concerned, which means facing history honestly, acceptance of responsibility by those responsible or their succes- sors, and solemn atonement for what was done fifty years ago. We need truth also in order to clarify the limits of what can be done to right that injustice without causing further harm. Once these have been established, it should be possible to work toward attain- able justice and therefore toward reconciliation. This is essential because our ultimate objective should be to end this conflict for good, which can only come from true reconciliation, based on truth and justice.48
Professor of Political Science Munther Dajani of Al-Quds University expresses similar views in The Palestinian Refugees: Old Problems—New Solutions:
At some point the Israelis must face the truth and begin the recon- ciliation process by accepting responsibility for injustices inflicted on the Palestinians in general, and the refugees in particular. This will open the way to usher in the Palestinians as equal partners. While it is true that it has taken the Palestinians a long fifty years to finally accept the Israelis, it is my sincere hope that it will not take the Israelis another fifty years to accept the Palestinians…as partners in the peace process.49
Nadim Rouhana argues that conflict reconciliation, as opposed to conflict resolution or conflict settlement, seeks to achieve a kind of rela- tionship between the parties founded on mutual legitimacy. For this to occur, issues of justice, truth, and historical responsibility as well as the restructuring of social and political relations need to be addressed.50
In his book Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return, Nur Masalha states that ‘‘any genuine reconciliation between two peoples—as opposed to a political settlement achieved by leaders—can begin only by Israel taking responsibility for the displacement and dispossession of the refugees.’’51
In my view, for a lasting peace to be achieved, the Israelis need not acknowledge their central role in the historical dispossession of the Palestinians as a people, or that they should take collective responsibility for evicting the Palestinian people from their homeland. As a pacifist, I believe in conciliation without the need for forgiveness as echoed in the Christian Lord’s Prayer: ‘‘Forgive those who trespass against us.’’ Research shows that learning to forgive those who hurt us can have profound benefits. It helps to manage anger, cut stress, and improve rela- tions. Forgiveness can be a powerful antidote to hate and bitterness.52 In her insightful article ‘‘The Power of Forgiving: Best Way to Heal a Heart,’’ Lisa Collier Cool lists five steps to find peace: ‘‘(1) Focus on the facts of the offense. (2) Don’t condone it, but try to understand what led to it. Try not to take it personally; you aren’t the only one to ever get hurt. (3) Focus on the offender’s humanity, not just his hurtful behavior. (5) Forgive for yourself, not anyone else. And forgive in your heart. You needn’t tell the offender.’’53
Glimmers of hope for peace
I. International initiative
The Road Map: Officially launched in June 2003, the Road Map for peace remains the only accepted political process for moving from a state of violence toward peace between Israel and the Palestinian authority. It has been endorsed and accepted by Israel, the Palestinian authority, and the Quartet led by the United States. Its main goal is the establishment of a Palestinian state, ‘‘independent, viable, and sovereign with maxi- mum territorial contiguity.’’ With regard to Jerusalem, the Road Map grants the Palestinians a political status equal to Israel; determines that the decision in the negotiations over the city’s status will be with regard to ‘‘the political and religious interest of both sides’’; and emphasizes that Israel should reopen Palestinian institutions closed in East Jerusa- lem. As for settlements, it demands that Israel should immediately dis- mantle all the outposts and freeze all settlement activities, including natural growth. On security, the Road Map calls for security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with participation by ‘‘American security representatives.’’ It demands that Israel cease its attacks on ‘‘Palestinian civilians.’’54
II. Arab initiative
The Saudi Peace Plan: Adopted at the Arab Summit held in Beirut in March 2002. Its main goal is the establishment of an independent Pales- tinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. It demands that Israel dismantle all its settlements and that Palestinian refugees be granted right of return for all the Arab states to establish
normal relations with Israel. The plan needs to be marketed authenti- cally to the Arab and Israeli public. Although unfortunately there is no minimal effort at present to pursue this initiative, it holds much prom- ise.55 The Arabs moved a long way from the 1967 Khartoum Arab Sum- mit of the famous three no’s: ‘‘no conciliation, no recognition, no negotiations,’’ and the 2002 Beirut Arab Summit of ‘‘yes to conciliation, yes to recognition, yes to negotiations.’’56
III. Joint Palestinian-Israeli initiatives
1. Ayalon-Nusseibeh people initiative: People’s Peace has been gathering momentum with tens of thousand signatures from both Israelis and Pal- estinians supporting the peace process. Its main goal is seeking a viable just solution to the conflict. It calls for the establishment of an indepen- dent Palestinian state, maintaining that the borders will be set along the lines of the Saudi peace initiative with a 1:1 territorial exchange and calls for the City of Jerusalem serving as the joint capital of both states.57
2. Beilen-Abd Rabbo Geneva initiative: Israeli and Palestinian ex-officials announced on October 2003 that they had worked out an unofficial peace deal, known as the Geneva Accord, which they offered as a blue- print for formal negotiations. It calls for the formation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the return of Palestinian refu- gees to that state, and the division of Jerusalem between the two states where ‘‘each side would govern its holy sites.’’58
3. Independent initiatives: (a) More than 150,000 Israelis demonstrated on May 15, 2004 at Rabin Square, calling on Israeli leadership to start talk- ing with the Palestinians and demanding that Israel pull out of Gaza. (b) More than fifty Palestinian-Israeli intellectuals, initiated and signed on July 25, 2001, the joint Declaration for Peace ‘‘No to Bloodshed, No to Occupation’’ which stated in part:
We refuse to comply with the ongoing deterioration in our situa- tion, with the growing list of victims, the suffering and the real possibility that we may all be drowned in a sea of mutual hostil- ity…. We implore all people of goodwill to return to sanity, to rediscover compassion, humanity and critical judgment, and to reject the unbearable ease of the descent into fear, hatred and calls for revenge…. In spite of everything, we still believe in the humanity of the other side, that we have a partner for peace, and that a negotiated solution to the conflict between our peoples is possible….
Which road to take?
While the Israeli and Palestinian masses dance to the tune of the maxi- malist big dream, radicalizing the discourse, few have opted for the less taken road of the minimalist Small Hope pacifying the discourse. One such voice is the Israeli Daniel Barenboim, the well-renowned Israeli musician, who in inspiring words stated in his acceptance speech for the Wolf Foundation Prize reflected the theme of the Small Hope:
With pain in my heart, I ask today whether a situation of conquest and control can be reconciled with Israel’s Declaration of Independence.
Is there logic to the independence of one people if the cost is a blow to the fundamental rights of another people?
Can the Jewish people, whose history is full of suffering and persecution, allow it to be apathetic about the rights and suffering of a neighboring people?
Can the State of Israel allow itself to indulge in an unrealistic dream whose meaning is an ambition to bring an ideological resolution to the dispute, rather than the aim of attaining a prag- matic, humanitarian solution, based on social justice?59
In the words of Palestinian intellectual Sari Nusseibeh: ‘‘It was the Palestinians’ misfortune to have been victimized by history’s greatest vic- tims, the Jews.’’60
Conclusion
In his Proverbs for Paranoids, the American writer Thomas Pynchon writes that if you get people asking the wrong questions, you don’t need to worry about the answers. That is why it is important for us to ask our- selves the right questions: What heritage and legacy do we want to leave for our grandchildren: Conflict, hatred, bloodshed or peace, goodwill, prosperity, and security? Why don’t we channel our pain and anger away
from hatred and toward peace and conciliation? As in the parable of the Prophet Ezekiel, why don’t we ‘‘revive the dry bones of peace, cloth it with flesh, lift it from dust and set it up as a joint concern’’? In his speech before the Knesset on July 13, 1992, Israeli Prime Minister Yitz- hak Rabin declared, ‘‘It is our fate to live in common on the same tract of land in the same country. Our lives are conducted with you, beside you, and against you…. For forty four years and more now, you have stumbled about in illusion.’’61
In their introduction to Creating a Culture of Peace, Gershon Baskin and Zakaria al-Qaq write: ‘‘It is quite a considerable challenge to ask how do we influence, mold, create, lead our own societies to create a culture where our children, the next generation of Israelis and Palestinians, will really be able to live in peace. How can we play a role in paving that road so the challenges that will face the next generation will be smoother and easier than the ones we face today?’’62
If we have a strategy to achieve peace, what would it look like? A peace strategy should have five main targets: to inspire people to look to the future rather than the past, and not to allow the past ‘‘to negate our ability to build new roads,’’ as Shimon Peres writes in his book The New Middle East,63 to bolster popular support for the peace initiative, to foster cooperation between the two negotiating sides, to create a culture of peace that holds non-violence64 as an only instrument to resolve conflicts, and to build a coexistence base that provides security for both. No doubt, security is a legitimate need for both sides and no security guarantee should be asked of one party at the expense of other. Security concerns should be equal, mutual, and reciprocal on both sides. Uri Savir, in his book The Process, stresses the significance of the security con- cept in Israeli psychology, ‘‘For Israel the critical issue was security; for the Palestinians it was political and national pride.’’65
Significantly, it is not enough to base peace upon political and eco- nomic agreements, as was the case in the Oslo Peace process or the Egyptian-Jordanian-Israeli peace accords; it must be founded upon a culture of peace based on understanding, respecting and appreciating each other’s values, perspectives, history, culture, tradition, religion, and aspirations.66 As Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin wrote, ‘‘In order to bring an end to the state of war in the reality of the Israeli-Arab conflict, there must be change in the psychological components, the perceptions and interests, not only of governments and diplomats, but also of the peoples involved in the conflict.’’67
This conflict can be settled peacefully if both Palestinians and Israelis try to negotiate their differences rationally and sensibly, understand each other, listen to each other’s arguments, defend their views stead- fastly but without violence.68 To move away from this culture of conflict, war, and violence, both Palestinians and Israelis ought to get closer to each other, not further away from each other. Konrad Adenauer was known for his dry humor. During his visit to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, some students used the occasion to voice their protests against Germany. Adenauer’s escorts urged him to pass on quickly, but he refused, saying: ‘‘Don’t we want to get closer to each other?’’69 They need to grasp the opportunity of peace; it may not come back again! Peace is not a utopian dream but the hope at the end of the tunnel.
In Jewish culture there is the recognition that the child at the Pass- over festival may deliberately, naively, ask questions that would be seen as inappropriate if they came from an adult. Let me then be that child and ask the following questions: Do key terms such as ‘‘peace,’’ ‘‘secu- rity,’’ ‘‘conciliation,’’ ‘‘coexistence,’’ mean the same thing to both Pales- tinians and Israelis? Do both people want peace, security, coexistence, and conciliation70 or continued war, conflict, and bloodshed? Wouldn’t it be much better to negotiate the establishment of a Palestinian state rather than to take it by force? And what is the future of such a state if established on the basis of force, hatred, and enmity? Aren’t both Israelis and Palestinians better off in denouncing the Big Dream in favor of the Small Hope?71
Back in 1986, Uri Avnery ended his book, My Friend, the Enemy, on a pessimistic note. ‘‘The chances of peace are at their lowest ebb,’’ he wrote. ‘‘Both in Israel and amongst the Palestinians, powerful forces are arrayed against it. Both superpowers seem indifferent.’’72 Nevertheless, he did not give up and continued his crusade with the other Israeli and Palestinian peace activists guided by Abba Eban’s observation that ‘‘men and nations often behave wisely once they have exhausted all the other alternatives.’’73 Thus, this is a cri de Coeur of a Palestinian who had suffered exile and his right to pursue happiness as a normal human being in his homeland. Finally, let me close on an optimistic note with these inspiring words of Indian writer Satish Kumar:
Lead me from death to life, from falsehood to truth. Lead me from despair to hope, from fear to trust. Lead me from hate to love, from war to peace.Let peace fill our heart, our world, our universe.74
Notes
‘‘Scholars expand peace in the world’’
‘‘Talmeedai chachameem marbeen shalom ba’olam’’ Hebrew Bible, Book of Proverbs
1. To the question, ‘‘Do you believe that ultimately there will be peace between Israel and the Palestinians?’’ only 18.3 percent of the Israelis asked answered ‘‘yes, within a few years,’’ 30.4 percent said ‘‘yes, but only in the distant future,’’ and 47.7 percent responded,‘‘not in the next 100 years,’’ with 3.6 percent responding ‘‘don’t know.’’ [Israeli daily Ha’aretz, ‘‘We have lost our optimism’’ (September 15, 2004), pp. B11-B12.]
2. Kenneth Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 3.
3. The West Bank and Gaza Strip have a combined land area of about 6,000 km2 with a population of around 3.3 million, a Gross National Product (GNP) of US$5.8 billion and a per capita GNP of US$1,824. The Palestinian diaspora is estimated at 3.5 million people. The economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is predominantly service-oriented. Trade constituted 13.6 percent of the Palestinian Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The economy is heavily dependent on Israel: over 85 percent of trade is with Israel. Moreover, about one- third of the labor force worked in Israel until the institution of the closure policy by Israel (120,000–140,000); earnings from these workers amounted to more than one-quarter of the income of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Remittances from Palestinians working in the Gulf countries have been another important component of disposable income, although this source of revenue has been substantially diminished since the Gulf War in 1991.
4. See Avi Shlaim, ‘‘The Oslo Accord,’’ Journal of Palestine Studies XXIII(3) (Spring 1994), pp. 24-40.
5. Also known as the Cairo Accord or Oslo I Agreement.
6. Also known as Oslo II Accord or Taba Agreement.
7. See: The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement: A Documentary Record (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993).
8. See: Uri Savir, The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East (New York: Random House, 1998).
9. See: George Giacaman and Dag Jorund Lonning, After Oslo: New Realities, Old Problems (London: Pluto Press, 1998); Uri Savir, ‘‘Why Oslo Still Matters.’’ New York Times Magazine (May 3, 1998), pp. 50-54.
10. Shulamith Harevern, The Vocabulary of Peace: Life, Culture, and Politics in the Middle East (San Francisco: Mercury House, 1995), p. vii.
11. Jeffrey Michaels, ‘‘National Vision and the Negotiation of Narratives: The Oslo Agree- ment.’’ Journal of Palestine Studies 24(1) (Autumn 1994), pp. 28-38.
12. Sunday Times (London) (June 15, 1969), as quoted in David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 264; see also: Amal Jamal, ‘‘The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partner- ship,’’ Journal of Palestine Studies XXX(1) (Autumn 2000), p. 36.
13. H. D. S. Greenway, ‘‘Leaving Gaza,’’ International Herald Tribune (April 27, 2004), p. 7.
14. For a comprehensive and in-depth study of the Hamas movement in Palestine, see Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000); Ziad Abu-Amr, ‘‘Hamas: A Historical and Political Background,’’ Journal of Pal- estine Studies 22 (Summer 1993), 5-19.
15. Dilip Hiro, Sharing the Promised Land: A Tale of Israelis and Palestinians (Brooklyn, NY: Olive Branch Press, 1999), p. 311.
16. In the early 1960s Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba told Palestinians in Jericho to take what is being offered to them and demand more later. They threw tomatoes and stones at him and accused him of being a traitor. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat asked them to join him at the first Camp David Summit and they branded him as a traitor to the Arab cause. They loved Arafat, who signed the Oslo Accords acknowledging the State of Israel but at the same time told them that their right of return is sacred and holy, implying that the 5 million refugees would return to Haifa, Jaffa, Bisan, Akka, etc. We keep missing one opportunity after another because ‘‘we live in the BIG DREAM that one day we will return to the homeland and the Israelis would just disappear in thin air because we are right and they are wrong.’’
17. N. N. Rouhana and D. Bar-Tal. ‘‘Psychological Dynamics of Intractable Ethnonational Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian Case,’’ American Psychologist, 53(7), 1998, pp. 761-70.
18. For a book that outlines official and unofficial Israeli and Palestinian policies on the fate of the refugees, see: Elia Zureik, Palestinian Refugees and the Peace Process (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997); also, Salim Tamari, Palestinian Refugees Negotiations: From Madrid to Oslo II (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996).
19. Mohammed Dajani, ‘‘Press Reporting During the Intifada: Palestinian Coverage of Jenin,’’ Palestine-Israel Journal 10(2), 2003, pp. 39-46.
20. See Gadi Wolfsfeld, The News Media and Peace Process: The Middle East and Northern Ireland (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
21. See Muhammad Hallaj, ‘‘Israel’s War on Palestinian Education.’’ The Return 2(6) (Febru- ary 1990), pp. 31-34.
22. The Center for Monitoring the Impact of Peace, 2000, http://www.edume.org.
23. Berl Wein, ‘‘Illusions,’’ Jerusalem Post (October 26, 2000).
24. ‘‘Hillary Clinton: Link P.A. Aid to End Antisemitism,’’ Jerusalem Post (September 26, 2000).
25. Spokesman for Israeli Settlers quoted by Christian Lamb, ‘‘Intifada: The Next Genera- tion,’’ Sunday Telegraph (October 15, 2000), p. 26.
26. Charles Krauthammer, ‘‘Is the Israeli/Palestinian Peace Process Dead, and if So, What’s Next?,’’ November 6, 2000, http://www.aei.org.
27. See the well-researched report prepared by Georgetown University Professor Nathan Brown for Adam Institute entitled, ‘‘Democracy, History and the Contest over the Palestin- ian Curriculum’ (November 2001).
28. IPCRI Study, Analysis and Evaluation of the New Palestinian Curriculum: Reviewing Palestinian Textbooks and Tolerance Education Program, 2003.
29. Israeli daily Ha’aretz (January 2, 2001).
30. Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot (August 3, 2000).
31. Robert Malley, and Hussein Agha. ‘‘Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors,’’ The New York Review of Books 48(13) (August 9, 2001), pp. 59-65; reproduced in Journal of Palestine Studies 31(1) (Autumn 2001), pp. 62-75; and ‘‘Camp David Proposal of July, 2000,’’ Negotiations Affairs Department, Palestine Liberation Organization, http://www.nad-pol.org.
32. For a clarification from the Palestinian Ministry of Education on the education system, see: ‘‘The Palestinian Curriculum and Textbooks,’’ Palestine-Israel Journal Viii(2), 2001, pp.115-18.
33. Maureen Meehan,’’ Israeli Textbooks and Children’s Literature Promote Racism and Hatred Toward Palestinians and Arabs,’’ Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Special Report (September 1999), pp. 19–20. See also: Y. Bar-Gal, ‘‘The Image of the ‘Palestinian’ in Geography Textbooks in Israel.’’ Journal of Geography 93, pp. 224–232; D. Bar-Tal, ‘‘The Rocky Road towards Peace: Societal Beliefs Functional to Intractable Conflict in Israeli School Textbooks,’’ Journal of Peace Research 35, pp. 723-42.
34. Different views on the wall are reflected in the following articles: Prof. Ephraim Ya’ar and Dr. Tamar Hermann, ‘‘A fence, yes—but not in Jerusalem,’’ Ha’aretz (Friday, April 18, 2003); Gabriel Danzig, ‘‘No to Unilateral Separation,’’ Jerusalem Post Internet (May 23 2002); Jerry Levin. ‘‘Supposing everything west of the Mississippi was Palestine,’’ From the inside Looking Out – Hebron Report 12. Mid East Realities, 2002; Mark Lavie, ‘‘Separation of West Bank and Israel Proposed,’’ US-World News (August 17), 2001; Nadav Shragai, ‘‘Dividing Jerusalem,’’ Ha’aretz (April 19, 2003); PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, ‘‘Israel’s Separation: Bad Fences Make Bad Neighbors’’ (June 6, 2002); ‘‘Unilateral Separation,’’ Econo- mist (September 4, 2001).
35. On my way from Dearborn, Michigan to the airport in early December 2004, my driver turned out to be a Palestinian from Beit Hanina who immigrated to the United States 30 years ago. I asked him: ‘‘Can you answer me honestly if I ask you this question?’’ He said, ask. I asked openly: ‘‘If today you are granted your right of return allowing you to go back home with a free ticket to Palestine, would you go to live there in your old home?’’ He responded with a question: ‘‘But let me ask you, will I have the same freedom and lib- erty that I enjoy here?’’ I answered: ‘‘You will have as much liberty and freedom as any Arab living in an Arab state, no more, no less.’’ He responded: ‘‘Then, no, thank you. I will rather spend the rest of my life here. It is my duty to my children to offer them a better life than the one I have had back home.’’ Part 2 of The Palestinian Exodus, 1948-98, ed., by Ghada Karmi and Eugene Cotran (Reading: Ithaca Press,1999), deals with the question of solutions to the refugee issue, specifically looking at the right of return, compensation, and reconciliation. In Chapter 9, Rashid Khalidi discusses his bold and controversial pro- posal for the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem based on abandoning notions of ‘‘absolute justice’’ in favor of working toward a solution founded on principles of what he calls ‘‘attainable justice’’ (pp. 238-39).
36. Elia Zureik, ‘‘Palestinian Refugees and Peace,’’ Journal of Palestine Studies XXIV, 93(1) (Autumn 1994), pp. 16-17.
37. See Edward Said, Peace and Its Discontents (New York: Vintage Books, 1996); ‘‘Palestinian Versailles,’’ Progressive (December 1993), p. 22; ‘‘The Lost liberation,’’ The Guardian (Septem- ber 9, 1993).
38. For a book that attempts to develop a method for using religion to resolve conflicts, especially the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, see: Gopin Marc, Holy War, Holy Peace: How Religion Can Bring Peace to the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
39. See: European Centre for Conflict Prevention. People Building Peace. 35 Inspiring Stories from around the World (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999); Galama, Anneke, and Paul van Tongeren, ed., Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice: On Lessons Learned, Evaluation Prac- tices and Aid & Conflict. Utrecht, Netherlands: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2002.
40. See the book published in 1946 by Maria Montessori, the pioneer of peace education, entitled, Education for a New World.
41. D. Bar-Tal, ‘‘The Elusive Nature of Peace Education,’’ in G. Salomom and B. Nevo, ed., Peace Education (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2002), p. 28.
42. I. Harris, ‘‘Conceptual Underpinnings of Peace Education,’’ in G. Salomom and B. Nevo, Editors, Peace Education (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 2002), p. 22.
43. For an assessment of the likelihood that the Palestinian education system would succeed in teaching the civic virtues necessary to democracy, see Andrew Rigby, Palestinian Education—The Future Challenge (Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), 1995).
44. For a paper on psychological obstacles to Israel-Palestinian reconciliation, see Israeli and Palestinian Identities in History and Literature, ed., Kamal Abdel-Malek and David Jacobson (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
45. See: M. Abu-Nimer, Editor. Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice (Lanam, MA: Lexington Books, 2001); Lederach, J.P. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, and by the same author, The Journey toward Reconciliation. Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1999.
46. See: Kamal Abdel-Malek and David Jacobson, Editors, Israeli and Palestinian Identities in History and Literature (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
47. Hizkias Assefa, People Building Peace. 35 Inspiring Stories from around the World (Utrecht: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 1999).
48. Rashid Khalidi, ‘‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation: Elements of a Solution to the Palestinian Refugee Issue,’’ in The Palestinian Exodux-1948-88, eds. Ghada Karmi and Eugene Cotran (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999), pp. 221-43.
49. Munther Dajani, ‘‘A Predicament in Search of an Innovative Solution,’’ in The Palestinian Refugees: Old Problems—New Solutions, ed., by Joseph Ginat and Edward Perkins (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), pp.243-44.
50. Quoted in Fouad Moughrabi, ‘‘The Politics of Palestinian Textbooks,’’ Journal of Palestine Studies, Issue 121 (Autumn 2001).
51. Nur Masalha, ‘‘The Historic Roots of the Palestinian Refugee Question,’’ in Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return, ed., by Naseer Aruri (London: Pluto Press, 2001).
52. See: D. Tutu, No Future without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1997); E. L. Worthing- ton, Jr. Dimensions of Forgiveness: Psychological Research and Theological Perspectives (Radnor, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 1998).
53. Lisa Collier Cool, ‘‘The Power of Forgiving: Best way to heal a heart,’’ Reader’s Digest (May 2004), p. 86.
54. Antonia Dimou, ‘‘The Road Map Peace Plan.’’ DEFENSOR-PACIS, Defense Analyses Insti- tute, Issue 13 (July 2003), pp. 78-86. For the text of the Road Map see: ‘‘The Road Map,’’ Palestine-Israel Journal 10(2) 2003, pp. 115-19. For a book that traces, portrays, and explains the American search for Mideast peace, see Dan Tschirgi, The American Search for Mideast Peace (New York: Praeger, 1989). Tschirgi follows a chronological approach of the period from 1967 to 1988.
55. See: Scott Macleod, ‘‘Arab Moves for Peace.’’ New Statesman 109 (March 8, 1985), 18-19.
56. At the end of the 1967 Khartoum Summit, the Arab heads of state agreed in their con- ference communiqué, ‘‘…to unite their political efforts on the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to insure the withdrawal of the aggres- sive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the 5th June aggres- sion. This will be done within the framework of the main principle to which the Arab states adhere, namely: no conciliation with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and adherence to the rights of the Palestinian people in their country.’’
57. Munther S. Dajani, ‘‘Achieving Security and Cooperation in the Arab Israeli Conflict: A Home Grown Peace Initiative (The Nusseibeh Ayalon Declaration),’’ Rivista della Cooperazi- one Giuridica Internazionale, VI(18) (December 2004), pp. 7-14.
58. Geneva Initiative: Peace Is Possible (Ramallah: The Peace Coalition, 2004). The 54-page Geneva document details the creation of a Palestinian state encompassing 97.5 percent of the West Bank with shared sovereignty over Jerusalem. The Palestinians will waive the right of return for some 3.8 million refugees under the initiative.
59. ‘‘A Renowned Israeli Musician Condemns the Israeli Occupation and Detonates His Prize to the Palestinian People,’’ May 11, 2004 (IPC + Agencies)-[Official PA website] Baren- boim remarks were met with a standing ovation by the audience during his acceptance speech for the Wolf Foundation Prize, which he received at the Knesset on May 9, 2004. The renowned musician has decided to donate his $50,000 prize to the Palestinian people aiming at encouraging the Palestinian music. Daniel Barenboim (60) was born in Buenos Aires in 1942 to parents of Jewish Russian descent. He started piano lessons at the age of five with his mother. In 1992 he became General Music Director of the Deutsche Staatsoper Berlin. In the autumn of 2000, the Staatskapelle Berlin appointed him Chief Conductor for Life.
60. Quoted in: Merle Thorpe, Jr., ‘‘Notes of a Bit Player in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,’’ Journal of Palestine Studies 91, XXIII(3) (Spring 1994), p. 42.
61. Yitzhak Rabin, Speech to the Knesset (July 13, 1992), quoted in, Amal Jamal, ‘‘The Pal- estinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership,’’ Journal of Palestine Stud- ies XXX(1) (Autumn 2000), p. 39.
62. Gershon Baskin, and Zakaria al Qaq. Editors. Creating a Culture of Peace (Jerusalem: IPCRI, 1999), p. 2.
63. Shimon Peres, The New Middle East (Longmead: Element Books, 1993), p. 3.
64. In 1988, the Yitzhak Shamir government deported Mubarak Awad, a prominent Pales- tinian Jerusalemite non-violent activist during the first Intifada, and thus preventing him from laying the foundation of non-violence philosophy within the Palestinian society.
65. Uri Savir, The Process (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 114.
66. Jerome Segal, an American Jewish academic, in his thoughtful book, Creating the Pales- tinian State: A Strategy for Peace (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1989) takes a historic intellec- tual journey that culminates in his advocacy of a two-state solution as the only way to achieve peace in the promised land.
67. Yitzhak Rabin, ‘‘Peace in the National Order of Priorities,’’ in Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Political Positions and Conceptual Frameworks, editors, Tamar Herman and Robin Twite (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1993), p. 15 {in Hebrew} quoted from: Amal Jamal, ‘‘The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership,’’ Journal of Palestine Studies XXX(1) (Autumn 2000), p. 37.
68. See: UNESCO and a Culture of Peace: Promoting a Global Movement (Paris: UNESCO, 1997), p. 5.
69. Konrad Adenauer for Reconciliation and Peace: Remembering the Past to build the Future (Jerusalem: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2001), p. 14.
70. The possibilities for peaceful coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians are illus- trated in Mine Enemy, by Amalia and Aharon Barnea (New York: Grove Press, 1988).
71. One good example is Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin: In 1948, Menachem Begin broke with David Ben Gurion because he could not agree to giving up any of the sacred soil of Greater Israel, that include Jordan. In 1978, Begin ceded back the Sinai removing all Jewish settlements, though Sinai is where Moses spoke to God and came down with the Ten Commandments.
72. Uri Avnery, My Friend, the Enemy (Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1986).
73. Abba Eban, ‘‘Building Bridges, Not Walls,’’ The Guardian (September 10, 1993).
74. Satish Kumar, Prayer for Peace (1981).